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Abstract 
 
A recent structural analysis of the T-3 Spent Fuel Containment Cask found problems with 
the design of the attachment system. Assumptions in the original SARP concerning the 
loading in the attachment bolts were found to be inaccurate in certain drop orientations. 
Similar weaknesses in the attachment system designs of other casks were also noted. This 
paper documents the lessons learned and their applicability to impact limiter attachment 
system designs. 
 
Introduction 
 
The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) is a 400-megawatt (thermal) Liquid-Metal (Sodium) 
Cooled Fast Neutron Flux Nuclear Test Reactor owned by the U.S. Department of 
Energy.  The original purpose of the FFTF was to be a test bed for the Clinch River 
Breeder Reactor Demonstration Program.  FFTF was designed with reactor components, 
plutonium fuel and liquid sodium metal coolant similar to a breeder reactor.  In the late 
1970s, a spent fuel cask designated as the T-3 was designed and built specifically for 
transport of spent nuclear fuel from FFTF. 
 
FFTF experimented with different fuel types including fuel that contained large amounts 
of sodium metal (1500g) between the fuel and the fuel cladding.  This fuel is referred to 
as sodium bonded fuel and both metal and carbide fuel of this type was irradiated at 
FFTF.  
 
Expansion of fuel components in a fast flux reactor often leads to a gap between the fuel 
matrix and the fuel cladding that inhibits heat transfer.  The placement of sodium within 
this region of the experimental fuel was used to alleviate this problem.  The thermal 
conductivity of liquid sodium is more than 100 times that of liquid water at similar 
temperatures.   
 
The difficulty with use of elemental sodium is the fact that it reacts explosively with 
water.  Although non-sodium bonded fuel can be cleaned of sodium residue to a point 
where there is insufficient sodium to challenge fuel and cask integrity in the event of a 
water reaction during transport, this is not true of sodium bonded fuel.   
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Adding to the difficulty with the sodium bonded fuel at FFTF is the fact that this fuel has 
an experimental cladding that has never had sufficient post irradiation examination to 
credit its integrity during transport.  The HT-9 and D-9 cladding could therefore not be 
credited with preventing a sodium water reaction under the required water inleakage 
scenario of 10CFR 71.55. 
 
               
 
Figure 1 
Sodium Bonded Fuel Assembly 
 
A secondary containment vessel was added to the T-3 cask in order to ship the sodium 
bonded fuel.  The containment vessel designated the 6CVLa, was designed to contain a 
single sodium bonded fuel assembly or pin basket.   
 
In the Application process for obtaining a Certificate of Compliance1 for the shipment of 
sodium bonded fuel in the T-3 Cask, analyses were performed which found weaknesses 
in the impact limiter attachment points not previously documented in the T-3 Cask Safety 
Basis2.  This paper described these deficiencies and their relation to cask design in 
general. 
 
T-3 Cask  
 
The Model T-3 Cask is a Type B package designed specifically to contain, shield and 
ensure subcriticality of irradiated fuel pins and assemblies from the Fast Flux Test 
Facility (FFTF) for transportation over public highways.2  No full or partial scale testing 
was performed to validate the T-3 design during the development of the original safety 
basis. 
 
The major design features of the T-3 Cask include two cylindrical and concentric 
stainless steel shells separated by 7¾ inches of lead gamma-shielding material.  Closure 
and sealing of each shell is independent.  The inner shell includes a length of 8-inch 
                                                 
a  6inch Containment Vessel Long  (6CVL) 
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Schedule 40 pipe welded to a machined adapter that forms an open socket to receive the 
closure plug.   
This tubular composite is terminated by steel endplates of varying thicknesses welded to 
the open ends.  The endplate at the plug end is annular to permit entry into the inner shell 
and ranges in thickness from about one inch to over three inches.  The endplate at the 
pusher end is also annular to permit entry of a slender push rod and ranges in thickness 
from 10¼ inches thick to over 12½ inches.  This pusher endplate is 13 inches in diameter, 
welded to a 2-inch thick annular plate that bridges the radial distance to the outer shell 
and closes the outer shell/inner shell structure.   
A stainless steel plug, approximately ten inches thick and double O-ring sealed, bolts to 
the open endplate of the inner shell to close the inner shell (Cask containment vessel) and 
provide gamma shielding.  The 1-inch thick outer shell is welded to the same endplates, 
providing structural confinement for the lead shielding material and surrounding the inner 
shell.  A carbon steel closure plate ranging in thickness from 4.0 inches to 6¾ inches fits 
over the inner-shell plug and bolts to the open endplate, closing the outer shell.  A 
cutaway of the T-3 Cask is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 
T-3 Cask 
 
The impact limiters shown in Figure 2 consist of low-carbon steel shells filled with rigid 
polyurethane foam each mounted via four ⅝-inch bolts equally spaced around the 
circumference of the cask. These impact limiters surround the ends of the cask to protect 
these extremities from structural impact and thermal damage. 
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Figure 3 
Impact Limiter Detail 
 
A cross-section of an impact limiter is depicted in the finite element detail shown in 
Figure 3.  The Cross-section bisects the cask so that two mounting bolts are shown. Each 
bolt is about four inches long and passes through an unthreaded lug on the cask body.  
The end of the bolt threads into an insert in the impact limiter that is attached to steel 
angle embedded in the polyurethane and runs parallel to the shaft of the cask as shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
The finite element model shown in Figure 3 is an advanced dynamic model depicting the 
cask in a steep angle drop just before impacting from a 30 foot drop in the vertical 
direction.  Impact limiter component material properties are fully modeled as are the bolts 
and lugs.  The cask itself is composed of rigid elements since this model specifically 
evaluates the impact limiters. 
 
The results of the steep angle drop indicated some unexpected results which were not 
documented in the T-3 existing Safety Basis.  The existing Safety Basis considered that 
the only significant impact limiter bolt loads in a steep drop (CGOC) would be axial 
loads from the moment applied to an impact limiter.  The detailed finite element analysis 
revealed that the bolts are actually loaded in shear.  
 
Figure 5 shows the results of the detailed finite element analysis. As the cask impacts in a 
steep angle drop, the shaft of the cask rotates slightly more than the impact limiter 
pocket.  This creates a displacement at the bolt attachment point which drives large shear 
strains in the short bolt.   
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Figure 4 
Original Analysis of Impact Limiter  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Results of Steep Angle Drop 
 
Figure 6 is a close up of the far left bolt showing the shear load placed on it by the 
relative displacement between the cask shaft and the impact limiter insert.  The impact 
limiter insert is well reinforced by the steel angle which is both embedded in the 
polyurethane foam and welded to the skin of the impact limiter pocket. The gap between 
the insert and the lug welded to the cask body is only a fraction of an inch.  This does not 
give the attachment bolts a  welded lug is a component with a high stiffness such that 
small rigid body displacements of the cask   
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Figure 6  
Deformation of Bolt Opposing Impact 
 
The other three impact limiter attachment bolts also reached the failure strain of the 
bolting material although the deformation is less pronounced.  Figure 7 is a close up of 
the far right bolt which has the lowest strain of the four attachment bolt.  Even so, the 
geometry of the short bolt results in large bolt shear strains. 
 
            
 
 
Figure 7  
Deformation of Impact Side Bolt 
 
These analysis results called into question the assumption that the impact limiters would 
be in place for a post impact fire event.  The SARP Addendum for shipment of the 
sodium bonded fuel addressed this issue by analyzing the cask without the impact 
limiters in place for the fire event.  O-ring seals and other component temperatures for 
both the cask and 6CVL were found to be acceptable for this event  
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A quick review of the impact limiter attachment systems of some more modern casks 
show that cask designers have incorporated the lessons learned from impact limiter 
attachment failures.  One cask design where this can be seen is the Hanford Unirradiated 
Fuel Package or HUFP design whose impact limiter is shown in Figure 83.  Although this 
design has a similar layout as the T-3 cask with four bolts passing through lugs on the 
shaft of the cask, there are several key difference.  The first notable difference is that the 
length of the bolts extends the full depth of the impact limiter pocket.  Also, the bolt 
pockets in the impact limiter allows for significant bending in each bolt before shear 
loads are transferred to the bolts.  The same relative displacements between the cask body 
and impact limit, lead to much smaller bolt strains in this design which was validated by 
testing. 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 8  
HUFP Impact Limiter Detail 
 
Conclusions 
 
Many older casks have impact limiter attachment systems which may fail in certain drop 
test orientations required by 10CFR 71.73.  Care should be taken to ensure that the 
assumptions in Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging (SARPs) are correct.  New cask 
designs should consider attachment bolt or pin loading conditions carefully when impact 
limiters are credited with remaining in place for the post impact fire.  
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